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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
vs. 
ALL REAL PROPERTY, RESIDENCE 
& APPURTENANCES LOCATED AT 
736 NORTH COLORADO STREET, 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116 
Defendant/Appellant. 
District Court Case No. 970903755 CV 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 20000828 CA 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE, STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, JUDGE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this Brief "T" refers to the transcript of the proceedings from the trial, followed 
by the date of the hearing to designate the volume. "R" refers to the record of the Court, 
and "Ex" refers to exhibit, followed by the exhibit number. Interested Party/Appellant, 
Bruce Petersen, will hereinafter be referred to as Petersen and Plaintiff/Appellee, State of 
Utah, will hereinafter be referred to as the State and Defendant/Appellant, All Real 
Property, will hereinafter be referred to as Defendant Property. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide the appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j), Section 5, Article VIII of the Utah Constitution and Rule 
3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR 
REVIEW. 
ISSUE ONE: Did the trial commit error by not granting Defendant 
Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Judgment due to the State's failure to properly serve 
Defendant Petersen with it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of 
Seizure/Intent to Forfeit as required by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. No deference. In re J.D.M.. a person under eighteen 
years of age v. A.W. Lauritzen, 810 P.2d 494, and review for correctness. Keller v. 
Southward North Medical Pavellion. Inc., 959 P.2d 102. 
ISSUE TWO: Did the trial court's refusal to grant Petersen's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and it's failure to make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
in support of it's decision constitute an abuse of discretion. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a 
default judgment and abuse of that discretion must be clearly shown. Katz v. Pierce, 732 
P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). Court's ruling must be based on adequate findings of fact and 
on the law. May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984). 
ISSUE THREE: Did the trial court commit error by granting the State a 
Judgment of Forfeiture of Defendant Property without making findings as to the 
proportionality of said forfeiture to the severity of the offense and whether said 
forfeiture constituted an excessive fine under the United States Constitution and 
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Section 9 of Article 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Factual findings made by trial court's in conducting 
excessiveness inquiries must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. State v. Real Property 
at 633 East 640 North. Orem. Utah. (Utah 2000). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES. 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189 (1962) 
Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000); 
State of Utah v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North. Orem. (Utah 2000); 
Wright v. Wright. 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997); 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2); 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(k); 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(a); 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(b); 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d); 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted. 
Article I, Section 9, of the Utah State Constitution: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor 
shall cruel and unusual punishment be inflicted. 
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RULES. 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This is an appeal from a ruling of the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Stephen Henriod presiding 
wherein the District Court entered a default judgment against Defendant Property 
ordering the forfeiture of said property. Said default judgment was granted based upon 
the failure of Petersen to file an answer on behalf of the Defendant Property to the State's 
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit, copies of 
which were mailed to Petersen, rather than personally served. While it is the State's 
claim that service by mail was authorized, it is Petersen's contention that rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), the statute 
which governs service of the Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit mandates that Petersen, 
as a claimant to Defendant Property and an indicted defendant should have been 
personally served with process and service by mail if allowed, should only have occurred 
by order of the Court. In addition, the District Court failed to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in support of it's default judgment notwithstanding Petersen's request 
to do so and further failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
reconciled the proportionality of the seizure to the severity of the crime. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture (R. 1) 
Certificate & Proof of Service and Motion for Entry of Default (R. 8) 
Judgment of Forfeiture (R. 11) 
Notice of Seizure/Notice of Intent to Forfeit (R. 13) 
Default Certificate (R. 15) 
Notice of Entry of Judgment (R. 17) 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (R. 20) 
Certified Mail on Return (R. 25) 
Minute Entry (R. 54) 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 56) 
Order Denying Claimant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R. 63) 
Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Denying 
Claimant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R. 66) 
Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 68) 
Response to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Bruce Petersen's Motion for 
Reconsideration (R. 79) 
Minute Entry (R. 93) 
Order Denying Bruce Petersen's Motion for Reconsideration (R. 95) 
C. DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW: 
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The Trial Court granted the State's Default Judgment against Defendant Property 
and subsequently denied Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion for 
Reconsideration or in the Alternative make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Bruce Petersen, is the owner of the Defendant Real Property located at 736 North 
Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. That on or about January, 1997, Petersen was charged with three counts of 
drug related violations in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, in Case 
No. 2:97-CR-0035J styled as United States of America v. Bruce Earl Petersen and Sonny 
Craig Petersen, (R. 34). 
3. That Petersen was arrested on these charges on or about February 6, 1997, and 
was taken to the Salt Lake County metro jail. He was bailed out on or about February 8, 
1997. 
4. After bonding out of jail Petersen resided at his sister, Jeanette's residence 
located at 626 North Colorado Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. Pre-trial services, all of the 
prosecution and police agencies were informed of or with little effort could have 
ascertained Petersen's whereabouts while he was staying with his sister. 
5. A Verified Complaint for Forfeiture was filed by the State against the 
Defendant Property on or about May 30, 1997. (R. 1) 
6. On or about May 30, 1997, a copy of the Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in 
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this matter, along with a Notice of Seizure/Notice of Intent to Forfeit was mailed to 
Petersen at Defendant Property, to-wit: 736 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
however, the United States Postal Service changed the mailing address of the certified 
mail to 626 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 25) 
7. That on June 23, 1997, Petersen was placed back in the Salt Lake County 
metro jail where he stayed until July 30th, 1997. All authorities involved in the case were 
apprised of Petersen's whereabouts. 
8. That on or about July 17, 1997, in the United States District Court, Petersen 
was convicted on two counts of the indictment filed against him. 
9. That on or about July 30, 1997, Petersen was transferred to a jail in Pocatello, 
Idaho, where he stayed until September 11, 1997, and was then transferred to the Davis 
County jail. 
10. At no time was Petersen ever served, either personally nor did he receive 
through the mail, a copy of the Verified Complaint or the Notice of Seizure/Intent to 
Forfeit which was filed by the State in this matter. 
11. Petersen was never made aware that an action had been filed until a default 
judgment had been entered against him. 
12. That on or about August 11,1997, the District Court entered the Default 
Judgment of Forfeiture against Defendant Property. (R. 11) 
13. On November 4, 1997, Petersen as record owner of Defendant Property filed 
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his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 20) 
14. On or about November 12, 1999, Petersen filed his Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment alleging therein that there 
was improper service of the Verified Complaint for Forfeiture as well as the Notice of 
Seizure/Intent to Forfeit. (R. 26) 
15. On December 2, 1999, the State filed it's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Vacate Judgment by Default. (R. 45) 
16. On December 27, 1999, the Court entered it's Minute Entry summarily 
denying Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Default without providing any Findings of Fact 
or Conclusions of Law to support it's ruling. (R. 54) 
17. On November 11, 2000, the State submitted it's proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Claimant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
(R. 56) 
18. On January 13, 2000, Petersen filed his Objection to the State's Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Claimant's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment, Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Request for Hearing. (R. 66) 
19. On February 3, 2000, the State filed it's Memorandum In Opposition To 
Petersen's Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Request for Hearing. (R. 72) 
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20. On February 18, 2000, Defendant Petersen filed his Response to the State's 
Memorandum In Opposition To Bruce Petersen's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 79) 
21. On March 8, 2000, the Court issued it's Minute Entry Summarily Denying 
Petersen's Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Request for Hearing without any finding. (R. 93) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Did the Trial Court error by not granting Petersen's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment on the basis of insufficiency of service of the Verified Complaint 
for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit. 
The State filed it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure/Intent 
to Forfeit with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court alleging therein that because 
Defendant Property was found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances and was 
derived from proceeds traceable to an illegal controlled substance transaction or 
exchange, said property should be forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated §58-37-13(2). Copies of the Verified Complaint and Notice of Seizure/Notice 
of Intent to Forfeit were mailed by certified mail to Defendant Property and were not 
personally served as required by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah 
Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d). Moreover, if it was the State's intent to prosecute it's 
forfeiture claim under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(a) through 
(2)(j) then it failed to comply with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13, 
which governs and directs how a forfeiture proceeding under these provisions is to be 
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prosecuted. 
POINT II. The Court's denial of Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
constituted an abuse of discretion in that the Court's denial resulted in a denial of 
the furtherance of justice and because the Court made no findings of fact or rulings 
based upon the law to support it's denial. 
The Trial Court's summary denial of Defendant Petersen's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment absent any findings of fact and conclusions of law reconciling it's ruling with 
the arguments put forth by Defendant Petersen alleging insufficiency of service of 
process and reasons, excuses and justifications for not answering the State's Verified 
Complaint for Forfeiture constituted a clear abuse of discretion. 
POINT III. The Trial Court errored by failing to make Findings of Fact as 
to the proportionality of the forfeiture to the severity of the offense and whether 
said forfeiture constituted an excessive fine prohibited by the 8th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution. 
The failure of the Trial Court to make a determination that Defendant Property 
was an instrumentality of the offense and to then examine whether the ordered forfeiture 
was "grossly disproportionate" to the offense violated the federal and state constitutional 
prohibition against excessive fines. 
ARGUMENT DETAIL 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR BY NOT GRANTING PETERSEN'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENCY OF 
SERVICE OF THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE AND 
NOTICE OF SEIZURE/INTENT TO FORFEIT 
On May 30, 1997, the State filed it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice 
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of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court alleging 
therein that because Defendant Property was found "in proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances" etc. and was "derived from proceeds traceable to an illegal controlled 
substance transaction or exchange in violation of the Utah Controlled Substances Act", 
said property should be forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§58-37-13(2)(k).(R. 1-3) 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(k), provides as follows: 
(2) the following are subject to forfeiture and no 
property rights exist in them: 
(k) all proceeds traceable to any 
violation of this chapter. There is a rebuttable 
presumption that all money, coins, and currency 
found in proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances, drug manufacturing equipment or 
supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or 
forfeitable records of importation, manufacture, 
or distribution of controlled substances are 
proceeds traceable to a violation of this chapter. 
The burden of proof is upon the claimant of the 
property to rebut this presumption. (R. 1-3) 
While Petersen questions whether this was the correct provision to seek forfeiture 
of Defendant Property since said real property was not procured by proceeds resulting 
from the violation of this chapter, the fact this is the provision the State relied upon in 
seeking forfeiture of Defendant Property is important in that it governs the procedures to 
be followed in the forfeiture action. In this regard, Utah Code Annotated §58-37-
13(9)(c) directs how a forfeiture action under this provision shall be commenced. In 
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pertinent part, Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(c), provides as follows: 
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection 
(2)(k) shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if 
within a prosecution district, the district attorney, or by 
the attorney general, either in personam as part of a 
criminal prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem 
action against the property alleged to be proceeds, and 
filed in the county where the property is seized or 
encumbered, if the proceeds are located outside the 
state... 
Conspicuously absent from this provision is any direction concerning how a 
complaint for forfeiture filed under Subsection 2(k) is to be served, however, Utah Code 
Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), does direct that in such a forfeiture action a Notice of 
Seizure and Intended Forfeiture shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court and served 
upon all persons who have a claim in the property and directs how service is to be 
accomplished. Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), provides as follows: 
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall 
be filed with the Clerk of the Court, and served upon 
all persons known to the county attorney or district 
attorney to have a claim in the property by: 
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is 
charged in a criminal information or indictment: 
and 
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose 
name and address is known or to each owner 
whose right, title, or interest is of record in the 
Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given 
upon the records of the division, which service 
is considered complete even though the mail is 
refused or cannot be forwarded. The county 
attorney, district attorney, or attorney general 
shall make one publication in a newspaper of 
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general circulation in the county where the 
seizure was made for all other claimants whose 
addresses are unknown, but who are believed to 
have an interest in the property. (Emphasis 
added) 
Since Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(c) is silent as to how the Complaint 
seeking forfeiture under Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(k) is to be served, it is 
assumed that since this action is defined as a civil action, that service of such a 
Complaint shall be accomplished in accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(1 )(a) defines "Complaint" under this act as 
follows: 
Property subject to forfeiture-Seizure-Procedure. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Complaint" means a verified civil in 
rem complaint seeking forfeiture....is subject to 
forfeiture. (Emphasis added) 
Rule 4, which governs service of process in a civil action provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Rule 4(e)(1) Personal service. 
Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by 
subparagraphs (2), (3) or (4) below, by delivering a 
copy of the summons and/or the complaint to the 
individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the 
individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode 
with some person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons 
and/or the complaint to an agent authorized by 
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appointment or by law to receive service of process; 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed 
at a facility operated by the state or any of its political 
subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the person who 
has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be 
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian 
or conservator of the individual to be served if one has 
been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly 
deliver the process to the individual served; 
(g) Other service. Where the identity or 
whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown 
and cannot be ascertained through reasonable 
diligence, where service upon all of the individual 
parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or 
where there exists good cause to believe that the 
person to be served is avoiding service of process, the 
party seeking service of process may file a motion 
supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing 
service by publication, by mail, or by some other 
means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the 
efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be 
served, or the circumstances which make it 
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties. If 
the motion is granted, the court shall order service of 
process by publication, by mail from the clerk of the 
court, by other means, or by some combination of the 
above, provided that the means of notice employed 
shall be reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the 
pendency of the action to the extent reasonably 
possible or practicable. The court's order shall also 
specify the content of the process to be served and the 
event or events as of which service shall be deemed 
complete. A copy of the court's order shall be served 
upon the defendant with the process specified by the 
court. (Emphasis added) 
Clearly, the State has not effected service of it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture 
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4 in that personal service was admittedly not 
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accomplished nor did Plaintiff comply with the provisions of Rule 4(g) concerning how 
service by mail was to be accomplished. Accordingly, if service of the complaint for 
forfeiture is governed by Rule 4, the Court was without jurisdiction to grant the State's 
default judgment since service of Plaintiff s Verified Complaint of Forfeiture did not 
comply with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the event Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), governs service of Plaintiff s 
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture as well as the Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit, 
Petersen still contends that the State's service by mail was insufficient since Petersen, as 
a claimant, had, previous to the filing of the State's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, 
been charged in a criminal indictment which necessitated that the State personally serve 
him, if not with both the Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure and 
Intended Forfeiture then with at least the Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit. 
Consequently, since the State's service by mail was in contravention of the requirements 
of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), said service was insufficient. Accordingly, if 
service of the State's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure/Intent to 
Forfeit is governed by Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), then the Court was 
without jurisdiction to grant the State's default judgment against Defendant Property and 
consequently errored in failing to grant Defendant Petersen's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment based upon insufficiency of service of process. 
While the State in it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture does not allege grounds 
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other than those specified under Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(k) as the basis for 
it's forfeiture action, Petersen believes it is necessary to reconcile how the State 
prosecuted it's forfeiture with all provisions of the Utah Controlled Substance Act in the 
interest of addressing all possible arguments that may be raised by the State in justifying 
it's actions concerning it's forfeiture action against the Defendant Property since the 
State may construe it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture as sufficiently broad to 
encompass all the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2) as the basis for it's 
forfeiture action. 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9) provides that forfeiture proceedings brought 
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j) should be commenced as follows: 
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as 
follows: 
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a) 
through (2)(j), a complaint shall be prepared by the 
county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the 
district attorney, or the attorney general, and filed in a 
court of record where the property was seized or is to 
be seized... 
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a 
criminal defendant, the forfeiture shall proceed as part 
of the criminal prosecution as an in personam action 
against the defendant's interest in the property subject 
to forfeiture. A defendant need not file a written 
answer to the complaint, but may acknowledge or 
deny interest in the property at the time of first 
appearance on the criminal charges... 
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by 
the defendant, the determination of forfeiture 
shall be stayed until resolution of the criminal 
charges. 
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Since Petersen had been charged as a Defendant in a criminal prosecution, the 
forfeiture proceedings under Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(a) through (2)(j) should 
have proceeded as part of the criminal prosecution and Petersen was absolved of the 
responsibility of filing an answer to the complaint filed under these subsections. 
Accordingly, if the State argues that it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture seeks the 
forfeiture of the Defendant Property under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §58-
37-13(2)(a) through (2)(j) then the State's failure to proceed with the forfeiture of the 
Defendant Property as part of the criminal prosecution as required by Utah Code 
Annotated §58-37-13(9)(a) and (b) is in contravention of the provisions of the statute and 
therefore must necessarily render the Court's default judgment against the Defendant 
Property as null and void. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF PETERSEN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THAT 
THE COURT'S DENIAL DID NOT RESULT IN A FURTHERANCE OF 
JUSTICE AND BECAUSE THE COURT MADE NO FINDINGS OF FACT 
OR RULINGS BASED UPON THE LAW TO SUPPORT IT'S DENIAL AND 
RECONCILE THE COURT'S DENIAL WITH THE REASONS. JUSTIFICATIONS 
AND EXCUSES FOR PETERSEN'S FAILURE TO ANSWER 
Clearly, it has been a long standing legal principle that judgments by default are 
not favored, nor are they in the interest of justice and fair play. See Heathman v. Fabian 
& Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189 (1962), and Wright v. Wright. 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997), and while the Trial Court does have broad discretion in deciding whether to 
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set aside a judgment, such discretion is not unlimited. The Court's ruling must be based 
on adequate findings of fact and on the law and at least with regards to a claim of 
insufficiency of service of process, must issue a brief written statement setting forth the 
ground or grounds for it's decision. Moreover, the Court's exercise of discretion should 
be exercised in furtherance of justice, and should incline towards granting relief in a 
doubtful case to the end the party may have a hearing. In Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 
(Utah 2000), our Supreme Court held as follows: 
...a trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether 
to set aside a default judgment. See Katz v. Pierce, 
732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Though 
broad, the court's discretion is not unlimited. As a 
threshold matter, a court's ruling must be "based on 
adequate findings of fact" and "on the law." May v. 
Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per 
curiam). A decision premised on flawed legal 
conclusions, for instance, constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. (Emphasis added) 
Moreover, the nature of a default judgment and 
the equitable nature of rule 60 provide further limits. 
See id, see also Schwab v. Bullocks, Inc., 508 F.2d 
353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974) (explaining limits to trial 
court's discretion under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 60 (which is virtually identical to Utah's 
Rule 60)); 11 Charles Ann Wright, Arthur R. Miller & 
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§2857, at 257-58 (2d ed.1995) (stating that "[b]ased 
on the remedial nature of Rule 60(b), the discretion of 
the district court to deny a motion for relief is limited." 
For example, we have stated that a trial court's 
"discretion should be exercised in furtherance of 
justice and should incline towards granting relief in a 
doubtful case to the end that the party may have a 
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hearing. Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 
1081 (Utah 1981) (citing Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 Utah 416, 420, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953)); see 
also Katz, 732 P.2d at 93 (stating that courts should be 
indulgent toward vacating default judgments where 
the defaulted party demonstrates a reasonable 
justification or excuse for failing to answer). 
Likewise, we have stated that "if default is issued 
when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point where, 
absent such a mistake, default would not have 
occurred, the equity side of the court...[should] grant 
relief." May. 677 P.2d 1110. (Emphasis added) 
Based on these principles, this court has stated 
that "'it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where 
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the 
defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is 
made to set it aside." Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081 
(quoting May hew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 
2d, 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951, 952 (1962). Thus, while we 
review the trial court's decision in the instant case for 
abuse of discretion, we emphasize that the court's 
discretion is not unlimited. (Emphasis added) 
Further, Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in pertinent part provides as 
follows: 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
...the trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions. The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision on all motions granted under 
Rule 12(b). 
Rule 12(b) provides as follows: 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to 
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hearing. Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 
1081 (Utah 1981) (citing Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 Utah 416, 420, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953)); see 
\flso Katz, 732 P.2d at 93 (stating that courts should be 
idulgent toward vacating default judgments where 
the, defaulted party demonstrates a reasonable 
justification or excuse for failing to answer). 
Likewise, we have stated that "if default is issued 
when &party genuinely is mistaken to a point where, 
absent stich a mistake, default would not have 
occurred/the equity side of the court...[should] grant 
relief" Mtiv. 677 P.2d 1110. (Emphasis added) 
Based 6n these principles, this court has stated 
that "'it is quite\unifbrmly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refiise to vacate a default judgment where 
there is reasonabl&justification or excuse for the 
defendant's failure to appear, and timeJy application is 
made to set it aside." Helgesen, 636/P.2d at 1081 
(quoting May hew v. Standard Gilsqfhite Co., 14 Utah 
2d, 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951, 952 (19/2). Thus, while we 
review the trial court's decision in the instant case for 
abuse of discretion, we emphasize that the court's 
discretion is not unlimited., (Emphasis added) 
x 
Further, Rule 52 of the Utah Rules 6f Civil Procedure in pertinent part provides as follows: 
Rule 52. Findings by the court/ 
...the trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions. The court 
shall, however/issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for it/decision on all motions granted under 
Rule 12(b)/ 
Rule 12(b) provides ak follows: 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fack to 
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claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the 
option of the pleader be made by motion: 
...(5) insufficiency of process. 
A o f S& ViCjL. 
Here the Trial Court made no attempt to reconcile it's ruling with the facts and legal 
arguments raised as to the sufficiency of service of the Verified Complaint, Forfeiture 
Complaint and Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit filed in this matter nor did it issue a 
brief written statement setting forth the grounds for its' decision as required by Rule 52 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
When considering the undisputed facts that Petersen was charged in a criminal 
indictment, incarcerated for significant periods, had moved from his original address and 
his whereabouts easily ascertainable by the State, all of which clearly suggests a 
reasonable justification for Petersen's failure to answer the Verified Complaint for 
Forfeiture, and further considering that the statute clearly mandates that service of at least 
the Notice of Seizure/Notice of Intent to Forfeit is to be accomplished by personal 
service upon a claimant charged in an indictment as well as the requirements of Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which likewise require personal service upon a party 
to a civil action and that service by mail only be permitted by Order of the Court, the 
Court's refusal to make any findings of fact reconciling it's ruling with these undisputed 
facts notwithstanding Defendant's request to do so by virtue of it's Motion for 
Reconsideration is clearly an abuse of the Court's discretion which has produced an 
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unjust result violative of Defendant Petersen's due process rights. 
Although the Court did sign and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law said 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were those prepared by the State and do not 
represent any findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Court nor do they 
address or reconcile any of the factual and legal reasons, excuses and justifications, 
raised and asserted by Defendant Petersen for why he did not answer the State's Verified 
Complaint for Forfeiture. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS 
OF FACT AS TO THE PROPORTIONATELY OF THE FORFEITURE 
TO THE SEVERITY OF THE OFFENSE AND WHETHER SAID 
FORFEITURE CONSTITUTED AN EXCESSIVE FINE 
Our Supreme Court in State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, Utah. 
999 P.2d 1254,1257 (Utah 2000), held that both the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution prohibits 
forfeitures that are "grossly disproportionate" to the offense and that in order to grant 
such a forfeiture, the Trial Court must do an assessment analyzing whether the Defendant 
Property is an instrumentality of the offense and whether the forfeiture was "grossly 
disproportionate" to the offense. The Court held as follows: 
We similarly hold that the threshold test in real 
property forfeitures is whether the defendant property 
is an instrumentality of the offense. If instrumentality 
is proven, we must then examine whether the ordered 
forfeiture is "grossly disproportionate" to the offense... 
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The fact that the trial court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law respecting a determination as to whether the Defendant Property was an 
instrumentality of the offense and then whether the ordered forfeiture was grossly 
disproportionate to the offense violated Petersen's federal and state constitutional rights 
that prohibits the imposition of excusive fines. The violation of these constitutional 
rights requires a remand to the Trial Court for a evidentiary hearing to render a ruling 
that comports with the Court's holding in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The State's failure to serve Defendant Petersen with process in accordance with 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and/or Utah Code Annotated §58-37-
13(9)(d) rendered the Court without jurisdiction to grant the State a default judgment 
against Defendant Property. Moreover, the Court's failure to grant Defendant Petersen's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment without issuing a statement setting forth the ground or 
grounds for it's denial or findings reconciling the numerous factors which militated 
against letting the judgment stand was a clear abuse of discretion and more importantly 
an abrogation of the Court's responsibility to ensure a fair and just result and that the 
result was in conformity with it's legal requirements as established and imposed by 
statute and rule. 
Finally, the Court's ruling is a grave miscarriage of justice in that the forfeiture of 
Defendant Property has occurred absent a determination that said property was an 
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instrumentality of the offense and forfeiture of the same was not "grossly 
disproportionate" to the offense. This omission by the Trial Court was violative of 
Defendant Petersen's constitutional rights and requires a reversal of the Court's ruling 
denying Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and a remand for an evidentiary 
hearing to determine the appropriateness and legality of said forfeiture. 
DATED this %£- <*ay of April, 2001. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendant/Appellant was [ ] mailed, postage prepaid, [ ] sent via facsimile transmission, 
[K hand-delivered on this Ju day of April, 2001, to the following: 
Clark Harms 
Lana Taylor 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM C 
UTAH RULES OK CIVIL ^KUUfcUUKr, 
failure to comply with requirement that he 
serve or mail a copy of the complaint to the 
defendant is not fatal to trial court's jurisdic-
tion over the defendant; fact that envelope 
containing the copy of the complaint was ad-
dressed to another person, as well as to the 
defendant, did not invalidate the trial court's 
jurisdiction, which attached upon the service of 
the summons, over the defendant. Bawden & 
Assocs. v. Smith, 624 P.2d 676 (Utah 1981). 
Statute of l imitations 
—Fil ing of complaint 
Where complaint was filed within period of 
limitations, action was not barred, even though 
summons was not served until after such pe-
riod. Keyser v. Pollock, 20 Utah 371, 59 P. 87 
(1899). 
Variance b e t w e e n summons and com-
plaint 
—Title 
Without some showing of prejudice, variance 
between title of the summons and the title of 
the complaint was not a proper basis to set 
aside default judgment granted by trial court. 
Bawden & Assocs. v. Smith, 624 R2d 676 (Utah 
1981). 
Cited in State v. Judd, 27 Utah 2d 79, 493 
P.2d 604 (1972); State v. Poteet, 692 P2d 760 
(Utah 1984); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 
(Utah 1988); Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1989); Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 
841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Wilcox v. 
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 103; 
61AAm. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to 352; 62B 
Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 8, 9. 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 54 et seq.; 71 
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408 to 412; 72 C.J.S. Process 
§ 3. 
A.L.R. — What constitutes doing business 
within state for purposes of state "closed-door" 
statute barring unqualified or unregistered for-
eign corporation from local courts — modern 
cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 466. 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and 
served. 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the sum-
mons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of 
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely 
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or 
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within 
the 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or 
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. 
(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the 
court, the names of the parties to the action, and the county in which it is 
brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name, address and 
telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the plain-
tiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time within which the 
defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify the 
defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered 
against the defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is on file with the 
court or that the complaint will be filed with the court within ten days of 
service. 
(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state 
that the defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed within 10 days 
after service and shall state the telephone number of the clerk of the court 
where the defendant may call at least 13 days after service to determine if the 
complaint has been filed. 
(3) If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the 
subject matter and the sum of money or other relief demanded, and that the 
complaint is on file. 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served in this 
state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or 
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constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the 
marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of 
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2), (3) or 
(4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to the 
individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to an 
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process; 
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy to 
the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none can be 
found within the state, then to any person having the care and control of the 
infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is 
employed; 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or 
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the person and 
to the person's legal representative if one has been appointed and in the 
absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, custody 
or control of the person; 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by 
the state or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the person 
who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be served, or to that 
person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to be 
served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the 
process to the individual served; 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a part-
nership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a 
common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 
process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the 
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. If no such officer 
or agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or 
holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the state or 
elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the 
person in charge of such office or place of business; 
(6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy thereof to the 
recorder; 
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the county clerk of such county; 
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy to the 
superintendent or business administrator of the board; 
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the 
president or secretary of its board; 
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be 
brought against the state, by delivering a copy to the attorney general and any 
other person or agency required by statute to be served; and 
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any public 
board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy to any member 
of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secretary. 
(f) Service and proof of service in a foreign country. Service in a foreign 
country shall be made as follows: 
(1) In the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in 
an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or 
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery; and upon a corporation, 
partnership or association, by delivering a copy to an officer or a managing 
general agent; provided that such service be made by a person who is not a 
party to the actton, not a party's attorney, and is not less than 18 years of age, 


























































7 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and 
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served as ordered by the 
court. Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed in these 
rules for service within this state, or by the law of the foreign country, or by 
order of the court. When service is made pursuant to subpart (3) of this 
subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or 
other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court. 
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be 
served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, 
where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the 
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be 
served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of process may 
file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by 
publication, by mail, or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set 
forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the 
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual 
parties. If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by 
publication, by mail from the clerk of the court, by other means, or by some 
combination of the above, provided that the means of notice employed shall be 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested 
parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or 
practicable. The court's order shall also specify the content of the process to be 
served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed complete. 
A copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with the process 
specified by the court. 
(h) Manner of proof. In a case commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the party 
serving the process shall file proof of service with the court promptly, and in 
any event within the time during which the person served must respond to the 
process, and proof of service must be made within ten days after such service. 
Failure to file proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. In all 
cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or Rule 3(a)(2), the proof of service shall 
be made as follows: 
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, United States Marshal, or the deputy of 
any of them, by certificate with a statement as to the date, place, and manner 
of service; 
(2) If served by any other person, by affidavit with a statement as to the 
date, place, and manner of service, together with the affiant's age at the time 
of service; 
(3) If served by publication, by the affidavit of the publisher or printer or 
that person's designated agent, showing publication, and specifying the date of 
the first and last publications; and an affidavit by the clerk of the court of a 
deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the United States mail, if 
such mailing shall be required under this rule or by court order; 
(4) If served by United States mail, by the affidavit of the clerk of the court 
showing a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the United States 
mail, as may be ordered by the court, together with any proof of receipt; 
(5) By the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be served, 
duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved. 
(i) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it 
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be 
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the 
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued. 
(j) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the 
process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall state the 
name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof. 
(k) Date of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the person 
making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left for the 
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person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and shall sign 
his or her name thereto, and, if an officer, add his or her official title. 
(1) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any proceeding 
where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court shall, 
upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate the 
newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall be made 
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and 
shall be published in the English language. 
(Amended effective March 1, 1988; April 1, 1990; April 1, 1996.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4 con-
stitutes a substantial change from prior prac-
tice. The rule modernizes and simplifies proce-
dure relating to service of process. Although 
this rule and Rule 3 retain the ten-day sum-
mons procedure for commencement of actions, 
this rule endeavors to make practice under the 
ten-day summons provision more consistent 
with practice in actions commenced by the 
filing of a complaint. The rule retains portions 
of prior Rule 4. adopts portions of the present 
federal Rule 4. and adopts entirely new lan-
guage in other areas. The rule eliminates the 
statement (appearing in paragraph (m) of the 
prior rule) that all writs and process may be 
served by any constable of the court. In the 
committee's view, this rule does not properly 
deal with the question of who may serve types 
of process other than the summons and com-
plaint. In recommending the elimination of 
paragraph (m). the committee did not intend to 
change the law governing eligibility to serve 
such other process. 
Paragraph (a). This paragraph eliminates 
the prior rule's reference to the issuance of 
summonses. See paragraph (b). Otherwise the 
paragraph is identical to the former paragraph 
(a). 
Paragraph lb). This paragraph, a substantial 
change from the prior rule, requires that in an 
action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the sum-
mons, together with a copy of the complaint, 
must be served within 120 days of the filing of 
the complaint. The time period was borrowed 
from Rule 4(j). Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph makes minor 
revisions to the corresponding paragraph of the 
prior rule. In addition to data historically re-
quired to appear in the summons, the address 
of the court and information concerning the 
plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney are also re-
quired. 
Paragraph (d). In prescribing the persons 
who may serve process, this paragraph elimi-
nates the prior rule's distinction between in-
state and out-of-state service. The paragraph is 
consistent with other changes in the rule de-
signed to simplify and unify practice for in-
state and out-of-state service. In order to be 
eligible to serve a summons or complaint, per-
sons who are not sheriffs or other law enforce-
ment personnel must be at least 18 years of age 
at the time of service. For eligibility to make 
service in a foreign country, see paragraph (f). 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph and para-
graphs (f) and (g) simplify, change and reorga-
nize the requirements for methods of service as 
they appeared in paragraphs (e) and (f) of the 
former rule. Subparagraph (e)(1) presents the 
general rule for personal service on individuals 
who are not infants, incompetent, or incarcer-
ated. Subparagraph (2) deals with service on 
infants and subparagraph (3) with service on 
incompetent persons. Subparagraphs (1), (2) 
and (3) are patterned after Rule 4(e), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Subparagraph (4) 
deals with service on persons who are incarcer-
ated or committed to the custody of a state 
institution. Subparagraph (5) deals with ser-
vice on business entities. Subparagraphs (6) 
through (9) change and modernize service on 
political subdivisions of the state. Subpara-
graphs (10) and (11) provide for service on the 
state and its departments, agencies, boards and 
commissions with only minor changes from the 
prior rule. 
Paragraph (f). This paragraph provides sev-
eral alternative means by which service must 
be made in foreign countries and provides for 
proof of such service. 
Paragraph (g). This paragraph replaces most 
of paragraph (f) of the prior rule. It is designed 
to permit alternative means of service where 
the identity or whereabouts of the person to be 
served is unknown, where personal service is 
impracticable, or where a party avoids personal 
service. Under the circumstances identified in 
the rule, this paragraph permits the court to 
fashion means of service reasonably calculated 
to apprise the parties of the pendency of the 
action. Use of this provision is not limited to 
actions traditionally considered in rem or quasi 
in rem. See Carlson v. Bos, 740 P2d 1269, 1272 
(Utah 1987). The present rule eliminates spe-
cific mention of service by telegraph or tele-
phone (in paragraph (1) of the prior rule) since 
such service could be ordered under this para-
graph if appropriate. The court's order of sub-
stituted service must specify the content of 
service and the event or events as of which 
service will be deemed complete. A copy of the 
order must itself be served so that the party 
served will be able to determine the sufficiency 
of service and the time as of which his or her 
response is due. 
Paragraph (h). This paragraph replaces 
paragraph (g) in the prior rule. It requires proof 
of service to be filed "promptly" and in any 
event before a responsive pleading is due. The 
rule eliminates failure to file proof of service as 
a basis for challenging the validity of service. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend-
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reason." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 
R2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Award of attorney fees to landowners against 
adjacent landowners, on the basis that the 
adjacent landowners acted in bad faith by seek-
ing attorney fees from landowners after obtain-
ing a quitclaim deed from landowner for the 
disputed property, could not be supported un-
der either § 78-27-56(1) or this rule, because 
when adjacent landowners filed their claim 
there was there was no clear prohibition on the 
recovery of attorney fees in undisputed quiet 
title actions and finding was not made as to bad 
faith on part of the adjacent landowner. 
Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
—Standard 
Sanctions were improper against an attor-
ney, where opposing parties conceded that no 
particular document was signed in violation of 
the rule, but simply argued that even if the 
attorney believed the case was well grounded 
when he filed the complaint, he should have 
known after he met with counsel for defendants 
that the case could not go forward. Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Utah appellate courts should use the three-
standard approach in reviewing a trial court's 
Rule 11 findings. This approach includes: (1) 
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact under 
the clearly erroneous standard; (2) reviewing 
the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Rule 
11 was violated and any subsidiary legal con-
clusions under the correction of error standard; 
and (3) reviewing the trial court's determina-
tion as to the type and amount of sanction to be 
imposed under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 
1992); Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
The determination of whether conduct vio-
lates Rule 11 is made on an objective basis. 
Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Rimensburger v. 
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P2d 876 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — 
Attorney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Curbing 
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is 
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579. 
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: 
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597. 
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues — 
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v. 
Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 877. 
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 
1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959. 
Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The 
New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-and-
Think-Again" Rule, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 879. 
Am. J U T . 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading 
§§ 339 to 349. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 339 to 366. 
A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for 
client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th 
249. 
Inherent power of federal district court to 
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in ab-
sence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789. 
Comment Note — General principles regard-
ing imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 
107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions 
for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in action 
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96 
A.L.R. Fed. 13. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions 
for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions 
for infliction of emotional distress, 98 A.L.R. 
Fed. 442. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in anti-
trust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573. 
Procedural requirements for imposition of 
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty days 
after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise 
expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service; 
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of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial 
on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after 
notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite 
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point 
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted 
and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order 
or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the 
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, 
the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule 
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available to 
him; If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all 
defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by moi 
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raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he 
does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made 
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination 
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is similar to Cross References. — Motions generally. 
Rule 12, F.R.C.P. U.R.C.R 7. 
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—Standard of review. 
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—Opportunity to present pertinent material. 
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Subject matter jurisdiction. 
When issues raised. 
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ADDENDUM E 
Rule 52 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 139 
Rule 52. Findings by the court, 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion 
is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made 
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for 
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to 
an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
- E q 
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Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
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—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
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Judicial review. 
—Assistance of counsel. 
ADDENDUM F 
58-37-11 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
8S
CifS, o 7 7 9 C J S - S e a r c h e s ™d ^ ^ u r e s §§ 12, 128 et seq. 
58-37-11. District court jurisdiction to enjoin violations 
— Jury trial. 
(1) The district courts of this state shall have jurisdiction in proceedings in 
accordance with the rules of those courts to enjoin violations of this act. 
UJ it an alleged violation of an injunction or restraining order issued under 
tnis section occurs, the accused may demand a jury trial in accordance with the 
rules of the district courts. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, 8 u 
Meaning of "this act." - The term "this act" means Laws 1971, ch. 145, which enacted this chapter. 
58-37-12. Enforcement — Coordination and cooperation 
of federal and state agencies — Powers. 
The department and all law enforcement agencies charged with enforcing 
tnis act shall cooperate with federal and other state agencies in discharging 
tneir responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled substances and in sup-
pressing the abuse of controlled substances. To this end, they are authorized to: 
W Arrange for the exchange of information between governmental 
officials concerning the use and abuse of dangerous substances. 
UJ Coordinate and cooperate in training programs in controlled sub-
stance law enforcement at the local and state levels. 
Tit l!
 r r
o o p e r a t e W l t h
 ^ e United States Department of Justice and the 
utan Department of Pubic Safety by establishing a centralized unit which 
will receive, catalog, file, and collect statistics, including records of 
arug-dependent persons and other controlled substance law offenders 
witnin the state and make the information available for federal, state, 
m n enforcement purposes. 
(4) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at destroying the wild or 
illicit growth of plant species from which controlled substances may be 
extracted. 
^History! L. 1971, ch. 145, § u , 1997,
 c h . 
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amend-
S£ t /£S n % 5 ' **?"' substituted 
UtahIwhl •'JST'VS J u S t i c e and t h e a c t " meansLaws 1971, ch. 145, which enacted 
Utah Department of Pubic Safety* for "Federal this chapter. 
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and 
the Utah Bureau of Investigation" in Subsec-
tion (3). 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this 
58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure 
cedure. Pro-
CD As used in this section: 
(a) "Complaint" means a verified civil in rem complaint seeking forfei-
ture or any criminal information or indictment which contains or is 
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amended to include a demand for forfeiture of a defendant's in personam 
interest in any property which is subject to forfeiture. 
(b) "Drug distributing paraphernalia" means any property used or 
designed to be used in the illegal transportation, storage, shipping, or 
circulation of a controlled substance. Property is considered "designed to 
be used" for one or more of the above-listed purposes if the property has 
been altered or modified to include a feature or device which would 
actually promote or conceal a violation of this chapter. 
(c) "Drug manufacturing equipment or supplies" includes any illegally 
possessed controlled substance precursor, or any chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies possessed with intent to engage in 
clandestine laboratory operation as defined in Section 58-37d-3. 
(d) "Interest holder" means a secured party as defined in Section 
70A-9-105(l)(m), a mortgagee, lien creditor, or the beneficiary of a security 
interest or encumbrance pertaining to an interest in property, whose 
interest would be perfected against a good faith purchaser for value. A 
person who holds property for the benefit of or as an agent or nominee for 
another, or who is not in substantial compliance with any statute requir-
ing an interest in property to be recorded or reflected in public records in 
order to perfect the interest against a good faith purchaser for value, is not 
an interest holder. 
(e) "Proceeds" means property acquired directly or indirectly from, 
produced through, realized through, or caused by an act or omission and 
includes any property of any kind without reduction for expenses incurred 
in the acquisition, maintenance, or production of that property, or any 
other purpose. 
(f) "Resolution of criminal charges" occurs at the time a claimant who is 
also charged with violations under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 
37d enters a plea, upon return of a jury verdict or court ruling in a criminal 
trial, or upon dismissal of the criminal charge. 
(g) "Violation of this chapter" means any conduct prohibited by Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d or any conduct occurring outside the 
state which would be a violation of the laws of the place where the conduct 
occurred and which would be a violation of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 
37c, or 37d if the conduct had occurred in this state. 
(2) The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in 
them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distrib-
uted, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter; 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or 
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, 
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this 
chapter; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property 
described in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not 
including capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or 
intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this 
chapter; 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transporta-
225 
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tion, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described 
in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the 
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited 
under this section unless the owner or other person in charge of the 
conveyance was a consenting party or knew or had reason to know of 
the violation of this chapter; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason 
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's 
knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance is subject to the claim of an 
interest holder who did not know or have reason to know after the 
exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take 
place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, 
tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this chapter; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in ex-
change for a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, and all 
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be 
used to facilitate any violation of this chapter. An interest in property may 
not be forfeited under this subsection unless it is proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the interest holder knew, had reason to know of, 
or consented to the conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture. 
The burden of presenting this evidence shall be upon the state; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37b-2, 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act; 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real 
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, 
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled sub-
stances in violation of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or 
interest in real property is subject to the claim of an interest holder 
who did not know or have reason to know after the exercise of 
reasonable diligence that a violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsec-
tion if the interest holder did not know or have reason to know of the 
conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture, or did not 
willingly consent to the conduct; and 
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or 
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or 
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under 
this subsection unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on 
the property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the 
street value of any controlled substances found on the premises at any 
given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced in 
controlled substances law enforcement may testify to establish the 
street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this subsec-
tion; 
(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in 
relation to a violation of this chapter or any firearm, weapon, or ammu-
nition kept or located within the proximity of controlled substances or 
other property subject to forfeiture under this section; and 
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(k) all proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter. There is a 
rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and currency found in 
proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug manufacturing equip-
ment or supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of 
importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances are 
proceeds traceable to a violation of this chapter. The burden of proof is 
upon the claimant of the property to rebut this presumption. 
(3) (a) Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by 
any peace officer of this state upon process issued by any court having 
jurisdiction over the property. However, seizure without process may be 
made when: 
(i) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search 
warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(ii) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior 
judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture 
proceeding under this chapter; 
(iii) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property 
is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or 
(iv) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property 
has been used or intended to be used in violation of this chapter and 
has probable cause to believe the property will be damaged, inten-
tionally diminished in value, destroyed, concealed, or removed from 
the state, 
(b) Upon the filing of a complaint, the court shall immediately issue to 
the seizing agency a warrant for seizure of any property subject to 
forfeiture which had been seized without a warrant in a manner described 
in this subsection. 
(4) In the event of seizure under Subsection (3), forfeiture proceedings 
under Subsection (9) shall be instituted within 90 days of the seizure. The time 
period may by extended by the court having jurisdiction over the property upon 
notice to all claimants and interest holders and for good cause shown. 
(5) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in 
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When 
property is seized under this chapter, the appropriate person or agency may: 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant under 
which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location 
for disposition in accordance with law. 
(6) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, 
distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this chapter are contra-
band and no property right shall exist in them. All substances listed in 
Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state may be 
retained for any evidentiary or investigative purpose, including sampling or 
other preservation prior to disposal or destruction by the state. 
(7) All marijuana or any species of plants from which controlled substances 
in Schedules I and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in 
violation of this chapter, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or 
are wild growths, may be seized and retained for any evidentiary or investi-
gative purpose, including sampling or other preservation prior to disposal or 
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destruction by the state. Failure, upon demand by the department or its 
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in control of land or premises 
upon which species of plants are growing or being stored, to produce an 
appropriate license or proof that he is the holder of a license, is authority for 
the seizure and forfeiture of the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this chapter by a finding of the 
court that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in 
the custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request 
that the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the 
seizing agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of 
controlled substances laws, the court having jurisdiction over the case 
shall award the property to the seizing agency. Each agency shall use the 
forfeited property for controlled substance law enforcement purposes only. 
Forfeited property or proceeds from the sale of forfeited property may not 
be used to pay any cash incentive, award, or bonus to any peace officer or 
individual acting as an agent for the agency, nor may it be used to supplant 
any ordinary operating expense of the agency. The seizing agency shall 
pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing and 
pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may 
not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against any defendant 
in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency, 
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific 
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the 
property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the 
payment of costs to the county attorney or, if within a prosecution district, 
the district attorney for legal costs for filing and pursuing the forfeiture 
and upon application for the property to the director of the Division of 
Finance. The application shall clearly set forth the need for the property 
and the use to which the property will be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications 
for property submitted under Subsection (8)(b) and, if the seizing agency 
makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and 
advisability as to final disposition and shall notify the designated appli-
cant or seizing agency, where no application is made, who may obtain the 
property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The 
Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse the prosecuting agency or 
agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to exceed 
the amount of the net proceeds received for the sale of the property. Any 
proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing agency 
or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection (8)(a) 
or (b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the property 
by public bidding or as considered appropriate, by destruction. Proof of 
destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the 
department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of 
the department or his designated agent. 
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as follows: 
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j), a 
complaint shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if within a 
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prosecution district, the district attorney, or the attorney general, and filed 
in a court of record where the property was seized or is to be seized. In 
cases in which the claimant of the property is also charged as a criminal 
defendant, the complaint shall be filed in the county where the criminal 
charges arose, regardless of the location of the property. The complaint 
shall include: 
(i) a description of the property which is subject to forfeiture; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and 
(iii) the allegations of conduct which gives rise to forfeiture. 
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a criminal defendant, 
the forfeiture shall proceed as part of the criminal prosecution as an in 
personam action against the defendant's interest in the property subject to 
forfeiture. A defendant need not file a written answer to the complaint, but 
may acknowledge or deny interest in the property at the time of first 
appearance on the criminal charges. If a criminal information or indict-
ment is amended to include a demand for forfeiture, the defendant may 
respond to the demand at the time of the amendment. 
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by the defendant, the 
determination of forfeiture shall be stayed until resolution of the 
criminal charges. Hearing on the forfeiture shall be before the court 
without a jury. The court may consider any evidence presented in the 
criminal case, and receive any other evidence offered by the state or 
the defendant. The court shall determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or release of the 
property as it determines. 
(ii) A defendant may move the court to transfer the forfeiture 
action, to stay all action, including discovery, in the forfeiture, or for 
hearing on the forfeiture any time prior to trial of the criminal 
charges. Either party may move the court to enter a finding of 
forfeiture as to defendant's interest in part or all of the property, 
either by default or by stipulation. Upon entry of a finding, the court 
shall stay the entry of judgment until resolution of the criminal 
charges. Any finding of forfeiture entered by the court prior to 
resolution of the criminal charges may not constitute a separate 
judgment, and any motion for disposition, stay, severance, or transfer 
of the forfeiture action may not create a separate proceeding. Upon 
the granting of a motion by the defendant for disposition, stay, 
severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action, the defendant shall be 
considered to have waived any claim that the defendant has been 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
(iii) Any other person claiming an interest in property subject to 
forfeiture under this subsection may not intervene in a trial or appeal 
of a complaint filed under this subsection. Following the entry of an in 
personam forfeiture order, or upon the filing of a petition for release 
under Subsection (e), the county attorney, district attorney, or attor-
ney general may proceed with a separate in rem action to resolve any 
other claims upon the property subject to forfeiture. 
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection (2)(k) shall be 
prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the 
district attorney, or by the attorney general, either in personam as part of 
a criminal prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem action against the 
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property alleged to be proceeds, and filed in the county where the property 
is seized or encumbered, if the proceeds are located outside the state. A 
finding that property is the proceeds of a violation of this chapter does not 
require proof that the property is the proceeds of any particular exchange 
or transaction. Proof that property is proceeds may be shown by evidence 
which establishes all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) that the person has engaged in conduct in violation of this 
chapter; 
(ii) that the property was acquired by the person during that period 
when the conduct in violation of this chapter occurred or within a 
reasonable time after that period; and 
(iii) that there was no likely source for the property other than 
conduct in violation of the chapter. 
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the 
clerk of the court, and served upon all persons known to the county 
attorney or district attorney to have a claim in the property by: 
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is charged in a criminal 
information or indictment; and 
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose name and address is 
known or to each owner whose right, title, or interest is of record in 
the Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given upon the records 
of the division, which service is considered complete even though the 
mail is refused or cannot be forwarded. The county attorney, district 
attorney, or attorney general shall make one publication in a news-
paper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was made 
for all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are 
believed to have an interest in the property. 
(e) Except under Subsection (9)(a) in personam actions, any claimant or 
interest holder shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint 
within 20 days after service. When property is seized under this chapter, 
any interest holder or claimant of the property, prior to being served with 
a complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court having 
jurisdiction for release of his interest in the property. The petition shall 
specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to have it 
released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney or, if within a 
prosecution district, the district attorney in the county of the seizure, who 
shall answer the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a 
complaint of forfeiture. 
(f) For civil actions in rem, after 20 days following service of a complaint 
or petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer 
is on file, the court shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportu-
nity to present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or 
release of the property as the court determines. If the county attorney or 
district attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for release and the 
court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to 
recovery of the property, it shall enter an order directing the county 
attorney or district attorney to answer the petition within ten days. If no 
answer is filed within that period, the court shall order the release of the 
property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the 
end of 20 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing. At this hearing 
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all interested parties may present evidence of their rights of release of the 
property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and 
order forfeiture or release of the property as it determines. 
(h) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the 
property in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited. 
(i) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not 
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper 
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture 
and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. 
When the property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release, the 
court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, 
storage of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfei-
ture, and costs of sale; and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund, 
(j) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in 
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture 
proceeding, including seizure and storage of the property, against the 
individual or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, 
and may assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the 
property as appropriate. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 13; 1982, ch. 
12, § 2; 1982, ch. 32, § 9; 1987, ch. 87, § 2; 
1990, ch. 304, § 1; 1991, ch. 142, § 1; 1992, 
ch. 121, § 2; 1993, ch. 38, § 59; 1996, ch. 198, 
I 31; 1996, ch. 294, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment by ch. 198, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote 
Subsection (9)(a). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 294, effective 
April 29, 1996, rewrote the section. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Meaning of "this act.* — The term "this 
act" in Subsection (5) means Laws 1971, ch. 
145, which enacted this chapter. 
Cross-References. — Division of Finance, 
§ 63A-3-101. 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, Title 
58, Chapter 37b. 
Utah Controlled Substances Precursor Act, 
Title 58, Chapter 37c. 
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, Title 58, 
Chapter 37a. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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forfeiture of vehicle. 
Grounds for denial. 
""-•Not found. 
Nature of forfeiture. 
^sumption pertaining to currency. 
^bable cause exception. 
Property right. 
Purpose of section. 
Requirements for forfeiture. 
—Description of property. 
—Interest in property. 
—Reason for possession. 
—Violation of chapter. 
"Bona fide" security interest. 
To establish a security interest as "bona fide" 
under this section, one must only establish an 
actual, good faith interest in the property not 
derived by fraud or deceit. State v. One 1979 
Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
An unperfected security interest is a "bona 
fide" security interest under this section. State 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
REAL PROPERTY AT 633 EAST 640 NORTH, 
OREM, UTAH, Defendant, 
Linda Cannon, Appellant. 
No. 980117. 
Jan. 19, 2000. 
County attorney filed action seeking forfeiture of 
residence pursuant to Controlled Substances Act based 
on alleged warehousing of illegal drugs on premises. 
The Fourth District Court, Provo Department I, Ray 
M. Harding, Sr., J., ordered forfeiture of property. 
Appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, 942 P.2d 
925, affirmed in part and remanded in part for entry 
of findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
constitutional challenges. On remand, the District 
Court denied owner's request for oral argument, and 
signed state's proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and owner again appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, C.J., held that forfeiture of 
residence was grossly disproportionate penalty, given 
small size of drug operation and relatively light 
sentence imposed. 
Reversed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Fines <&* 1.3 
174 
174kl.3 Excessive Fines. 
(Formerly 110kl214) 
The threshold test in determining whether the 
forfeiture of real property violates the federal 
constitutional prohibition against excessive fines is 
whether the defendant property is an instrumentality 
of the offense. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 8. 
[2] Fines <®=> 1.3 
174 — 
174kl.3 Excessive Fines. 
(Formerly 110kl214) 
In determining whether the forfeiture of real 
property violates the federal constitutional prohibition 
against excessive fines, once it has been demonstrated 
that the defendant property is an instrumentaUty of the 
offense, the court must next examine whether the 
ordered forfeiture is "grossly disproportionate" to the 
offense. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. 
[3] F i n e s t 1.3 
174 — 
174kl.3 Excessive Fines. 
(Formerly 110kl214) 
The proportionality prong of an excessiveness 
inquiry challenging a forfeiture of real property as 
excessive fine is guided by objective criteria, 
including: (1) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; (2) the harshness of the 
forfeiture; (3) the sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (4) the 
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime 
in other jurisdictions. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. 
[4] Fines <©==> 1.3 
174 — 
174kl.3 Excessive Fines. 
(Formerly 110kl214) 
For purposes of determining whether a forfeiture of 
real property is unconstitutionally excessive fine, the 
court should analyze the gravity of the offense factor 
in light of: (1) the harm caused by the illegal activity, 
including, in the drug trafficking context, the amount 
of drugs and their value, the duration of the illegal 
activity, and the effect on the community; and (2) the 
actual sentence the defendant received as a result of 
the offense compared to the maximum punishments 
authorized. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. 
[5]Fines<@=>1.3 
174 — 
174kl.3 Excessive Fines. 
(Formerly 110kl214) 
For purposes of determining whether a forfeiture of 
real property is unconstitutionally excessive, the court 
should analyze the harshness of the forfeiture factor in 
light of: (1) the fair market value of the property; (2) 
the intangible, subjective value of the property; and 
(3) the hardship to the defendant, including the effect 
of the forfeiture on defendant's family or financial 
condition. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. 
[6] Forfeitures <@==*5 
180 — 
180k5 Proceedings for Enforcement. 
Factual findings made by trial courts in conducting 
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inquiries into the alleged excessiveness of a forfeiture 
must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. 
[7] Criminal Law <®^ > 1139 
110 — 
110XXTV Review 
110XXJV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110kll39 Additional Proofs and Trial De Novo. 
The question of whether a fine is constitutionally 
excessive requires the application of a constitutional 
standard to the facts of the individual case, and thus 
de novo review of the question is appropriate. 
[8] Fines ® ^ 1.3 
174 — 
174kl.3 Excessive Fines. 
(Formerly 110kl214) 
[See headnote text below] 
[8] Drugs and Narcotics @=*191 
138 — 
138II Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
13811(E) Forfeitures 
138kl91 Property Subject to Forfeiture. 
Forfeiture of residence upon defendant's convictions 
for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, 
possession of cocaine, illegal drug tax, and possession 
of drug paraphernalia was grossly disproportionate 
penalty, where defendant's drug operation was very 
small, actual fines, surcharges, and penalties of 
$9,660.10 were imposed, defendant received sentence 
of probation, and forfeited real property had value of 
approximately $80,000. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8. 
*1255 James Taylor, Laura Cabanilla, Provo, for 
plaintiff. 
Randall Gaither, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
HOWE, Chief Justice: 
t 1 Linda Cannon appeals from a trial court-ordered 
forfeiture of her real property located at 633 East 640 
North in Orem, Utah (the "defendant property"), 
following her conviction for several drug-related 
offenses. She contends that the forfeiture violated 
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and 
excessive fines. She also assigns as error the trial 
court's taking judicial notice on remand of the final 
disposition of criminal proceedings arising out of two 
later searches of the defendant property, alleging that 
the trial court thereby violated her constitutional due 
process rights. 
1f 2 This matter is before us for the second time. On 
Cannon's previous appeal, we remanded the case to 
the trial court for an entry of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding her constitutional claims. 
See State v. 633 East 640 North, 942 P.2d 925 (Utah 
1997). We refer the reader to our opinion in that case 
for a full recitation of the relevant facts. Briefly 
stated, following a seizure of narcotics, drug 
paraphernalia, and related monies found during a 
warranted search (the "first warranted search"), the 
Utah County attorney, on behalf of the State of Utah, 
brought this action to forfeit the defendant property 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13, the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act ("UCSA"). In the next 
eighteen months, two additional searches—and 
additional seizures of drugs and drug paraphernalia-
were conducted. A jury convicted Cannon on several 
drug charges stemming from the first search. (FN1) 
After undergoing a sixty-day evaluation in the Utah 
State Prison's Diagnostic Unit, the trial court placed 
her on probation and ordered her to enter and 
complete a drug treatment program. 
K 3 Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the 
forfeiture of the defendant property, valued at between 
$71,272.30 and $80,000.00. Cannon subsequently 
appealed the *1256 forfeiture order to this court. 
We affirmed the trial court's rulings; however, we 
remanded the case for an entry of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on the constitutional challenges so 
that we could address the trial court's alleged 
violations of Cannon's constitutional protections 
against excessive fines and double jeopardy. 
f 4 On remand, both Cannon and the State filed 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; 
Cannon also filed a request for oral argument. The 
trial court denied the request for oral argument and 
signed the State's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, taking judicial notice of the second and third 
searches of the defendant property and the resolution 
of resultant criminal charges against her. Cannon 
now appeals, claiming her state and federal 
constitutional due process protections (FN2) against 
excessive fines (FN3) and double jeopardy (FN4) 
have been violated. 
ANALYSIS 
I. FORFEITURE AS AN "EXCESSIVE FINE" 
f 5 Cannon contends that the trial court-ordered 
forfeiture of her residence violated her state and 
federal constitutional protections against the 
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imposition of excessive fines. However, because 
Cannon fails to support her state constitutional 
arguments with any substantive analysis, these 
arguments do not warrant separate analysis under the 
Utah Constitution. Accordingly, we decide this case 
on the basis of the United States Constitution alone. 
See State v. 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d 534, 539 n. 
7 (Utah 1994); State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224 
n. 2(UtahCt.App.l995). 
U 6 Because the law in Utah is unsettled, our holding 
today sets forth the analysis for use in future forfeiture 
cases under the Excessive Fines Clause. In doing so, 
we draw upon the following cases: United States v. 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 
L.Ed.2d 314 (1998); United States v. 6380 Little 
Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995); 392 South 
600 East, 886 P.2d at 542 (quoting United States v. 
9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 331 (8th 
Cir. 1994)). 
1^ 7 Before turning to Cannon's specific arguments, 
it is first necessary to examine the history of excessive 
fines analysis. The United States Constitution 
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed....11 U.S. Const, amend. 
VIE. The historical foundation and reasoning behind 
current excessive fines analysis has been well 
documented elsewhere; a brief history is sufficient 
for our purposes here. (FN5) 
f 8 In Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 
S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines 
Clause applied to drug-related forfeitures of property. 
Id. at 622, 113 S.Ct. 2801. The Court, however, 
declined to estabhsh a specific test to determine when 
a forfeiture should be considered constitutionally 
excessive, deciding instead to "allow the lower courts 
to consider that question in the first instance." Id. at 
622-23, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (citations omitted). Justice 
Scalia proposed that the sole measure of excessiveness 
should be the relationship between the defendant 
property and the offense, i.e., the property's 
"instrumentality." Id. at 627-28, 113 S.Ct. 2801 
(Scalia, J., concurring). The majority considered 
Scalia's "instrumentality test," but stated: "We do not 
rule out the possibility that the connection between the 
property and the offense may be relevant, but our 
decision today in no way limits [lower courts] from 
considering other factors in determining *1257 
whether the forfeiture of ... property was excessive." 
Id. at 623 n. 15, 113 S.Ct. 2801. 
^ 9 Since Austin, "there has been little uniformity 
both within and between the circuits as to the 
appropriate test to determine excessiveness. In order 
to promote uniformity, it is desirable to standardize 
the analysis used to determine when specific 
forfeitures violate the Excessive Fines Clause." 
Caione, supra note 5 at 1095; see also United States 
v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F.Supp. 1389, 1397-98 & 
nn. 16-19 (M.D.Ala. 1994) (noting existence of cases 
adopting each of following tests: pure 
instrumentality, pure proportionality, multifactor, and 
a combined instrumentality and proportionality test). 
In Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 
L.Ed.2d 314 (1998), however, the United States 
Supreme Court clarified the requisite standard. 
Realizing the inherent subjectivity and imprecision in 
judicial determinations of the gravity of an offense, 
and examining how the legislature has treated 
constitutional excessiveness in other contexts, the 
Court rejected a strict proportionality test in favor of a 
"gross disproportionality standard." Bajakajian, 524 
U.S. at 329, 118 S.Ct. 2028. 
Tf 10 We have addressed the issue of forfeitures as 
excessive fines on only a few occasions. In the most 
recent wstance--pre-Bajakajian--v/e followed the 
suggestion in Austin that "the connection between the 
defendant property and the offense is the beginning 
point, rather than the sole criterion, in determining 
whether a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive." 
392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542 (citation 
omitted). We declined to estabhsh any further steps 
in the analysis, stating that as future situations arise in 
which an instrumentality analysis is not dispositive, 
we would address additional factors at that time. See 
id. at 542. 
TJ 11 Now, the Bajakajian opinion provides us with 
the second prong to our excessive fines test merely 
hinted at in 392 South 600 East, namely, gross 
disproportionality. The Ninth Circuit prescribed a 
similar two-prong test in 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995) (*6380 Little Canyon Road 
"). There, the court indicated that "instrumentality is 
a threshold test.... If the government succeeds in 
showing a substantial connection between the property 
... and the offense, then the claimant has the burden to 
show that forfeiture of his property would be grossly 
disproportionate given the nature and extent of his 
criminal culpability." Id. at 985 (footnotes omitted). 
[1][2] If 12 We similarly hold that the threshold test 
in real property forfeitures (FN6) is whether the 
defendant property is an instrumentality of the 
offense. If instrumentality is proven, we must then 
examine whether the ordered forfeiture is "grossly 
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disproportionate" to the offense. However, because 
in the instant case we rest our decision on gross 
disproportionaUty, we will assume for purposes of 
discussion, but not decide, that the instrumentality test 
has been satisfied. 
f 13 We now examine whether the forfeiture is 
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. 
In 392 South 600 East, we stated: "As future cases 
present situations in which the instrumentality analysis 
is not dispositive, we can address other factors that 
may be comprehended by an excessive fines 
analysis." 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542. 
One of the "future cases" we foresaw is now before 
us. Fortunately, because of Bajakajian, we are no 
longer left entirely to our own devices in addressing 
what these "other factors" may be. 
T| 14 The Bajakajian court clarified the 
excessiveness analysis, rejecting strict proportionality 
and adopting instead a "gross disproportionaUty" 
standard, declaring: 
In applying this standard, the district courts in the 
first instance, and the courts of appeals, reviewing 
the proportionaUty determination de novo, must 
compare the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity 
of *1258 the defendant's offense. If the amount of 
the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the 
gravity of the defendant's offense, it is 
unconstitutional. 
524 U.S. at 331, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (footnotes omitted). 
This, then, provides the second prong for future 
excessiveness analyses. 
1. The test in theory 
U 15 The individual factors Bajakajian set forth to 
determine the gravity of a specific offense are those 
articulated in the United States Supreme Court's Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause precedents. See 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 330-31, 118 S.Ct. 2028 
(citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 
3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), overruled on other 
grounds by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 
S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); (FN7) Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 
L.Ed.2d 382 (1980)). These precedents suggest that 
the proportionaUty prong of an excessiveness inquiry 
"should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) 
the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the 
penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals 
in the same jurisdiction; and (ui) the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions." Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. 
3001. Upon review of the Solem test, the Bajakajian 
court has determined and this court now determines 
that it is adaptable for use in forfeiture cases. 
U 16 Instead of applying a strict Solem test, 
however, both parties have focused on a sample Ust of 
factors we cited in Nephi. Cannon asserts that these 
factors show the forfeiture here was grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The 
State uses the same factors to contend just the 
opposite. (FN8) 
Tf 17 The factors that we suggested in Nephi were 
factors the Eighth Circuit used in its excessiveness 
analysis. Those factors included " 'the monetary 
value of the property, the extent of criminal activity 
associated with the property, the fact that the property 
was a residence, the effect of forfeiture on innocent 
occupants of the residence, including children, or any 
other factors that an excessive fines analysis might 
require.' " 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542 
(quoting United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 
F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir.1994)). The Ninth Circuit, in 
6380 Little Canyon Road, utilized a similar and 
somewhat more expansive analysis: once the 
government proves instrumentaUty, "the claimant has 
the burden to show that forfeiture of his property 
would be grossly disproportionate given the nature 
and extent of his criminal culpabiUty." 6380 Little 
Canyon Road, 59 F.3d at 985. To determine the 
forfeiture's harshness, the Ninth Circuit set forth three 
factors: "(1) the fair market value of the property; 
(2) the intangible, subjective value of the property, 
e.g., whether it is the family home; and (3) the 
hardship to the defendant, including the effect of the 
forfeiture on defendant's family *1259 or financial 
condition." Id. To determine the defendant's 
culpabiUty, that court looked at: 
(1) whether the owner was negUgent or reckless in 
allowing the illegal use of his property; or 
(2) whether the owner was directly involved in the 
illegal activity, and to what extent; and 
(3) the harm caused by the illegal activity, including 
(a) (in the drug trafficking context) the amount of 
drugs and their value, (b) the duration of the illegal 
activity, and (c) the effect on the community. 
U. at 986. 
Tf 18 We beUeve these factors complement the Solem 
test. We realize that the judicial determination of the 
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gravity of a particular offense, as the Bajakajian court 
indicated, is inherently subjective and imprecise. 
However, use of these factors in conjunction with the 
Solem test will lessen the subjectivity of the analysis, 
acting as effective gauges for the gravity of an 
offense. (FN9) Therefore, we hold that the Solem 
test, using the factors set forth above from 392 South 
600 East and 6380 Little Canyon Road to complement 
the court's analysis, is the appropriate measure of 
excessiveness in this jurisdiction. (FN 10) 
f 19 One additional factor is necessary to complete 
an excessiveness analysis: the comparative 
punishment factor. "In considering an offense's 
gravity, the other penalties that the Legislature has 
authorized are certainly relevant evidence." 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 332 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 2028. 
In Bajakajian, the defendant faced a maximum fine of 
$250,000.00 plus five years' imprisonment. See id. 
These figures suggest, as the Court stated, that 
Congress, in authorizing these punishments, did not 
view the offense as trivial. See id. The actual 
sentence the defendant received was three years' 
probation and a $5,000.00 fine. See id. at 324, 118 
S.Ct. 2028. The Court continued, holding that 
the maximum fine and Guideline sentence to which 
respondent was subject were but a fraction of the 
penalties authorized ... undercuts any argument 
based solely on the statute, because they show that 
respondent's culpability relative to other potential 
violators of the ... provision—tax evaders, drug 
kingpins, or money launderers, for example—is 
small indeed. This disproportion is telling.... 
Id. at 332 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Finding 
disproportionality, the Court held full forfeiture would 
violate the Excessive Fines clause, and thereby 
affirmed the lower courts' rulings and rejected the 
government's appeal. Id. at 335, 118 S.Ct. 2028 
T[ 20 Including this factor in the final test makes 
sense. After all, two separate individuals, convicted 
of an "identical" crime may receive vastly different 
sentences based on inherently individualized facts. 
During sentencing, the defendant's culpability is 
evaluated, and punitive measures are meted out 
accordingly. The harsher the sentence, fines, and 
penalties a defendant receives, the less likely it is that 
a forfeiture may be grossly disproportionate. If a 
defendant receives only a small percentage of the 
"maximum" possible penalty, it is more likely— 
although still not dispositive—that the forfeiture may 
be constitutionally excessive. 
[3] [4] [5] U 21 In short, a court must look at four 
main factors: 
(1) the gravity of the particular offense; 
(2) the harshness of the forfeiture; 
(3) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction; and 
(4) the sentences imposed for commission of the 
same crime in other jurisdictions. 
In gauging the gravity of the offense (factor (1) 
above), a court should take into consideration: 
(a) the harm caused by the illegal activity, including 
(i) (in the drug trafficking context) the amount of 
drugs and their value, (ii) the duration of the illegal 
activity, and (iii) the effect on the community; and 
*1260 (b) the actual sentence the defendant received 
as a result of the offense compared to the maximum 
punishments authorized. 
In judging the harshness of the forfeiture (factor (2) 
above), a court should look at: 
(a) the fair market value of the property; 
(b) the intangible, subjective value of the property, 
e.g., whether it is the family home; and 
(c) the hardship to the defendant, including the effect 
of the forfeiture on defendant's family or financial 
condition. 
2. The test as applied to the instant case 
[6] [7] f 22 Factual findings made by trial courts in 
conducting excessiveness inquiries must be accepted 
unless clearly erroneous. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 
331 n. 10, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (citing Anderson v. 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct. 
1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). However, the 
question of whether a fine is constitutionally excessive 
requires the application of a constitutional standard to 
the facts of the individual case. In that context, de 
novo review of the question is appropriate. See id. 
(citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 
116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). 
[8] f 23 The police seized from the defendant 
property less than two pounds of marijuana in three 
searches within eighteen months, with a street value 
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of approximately $7,200.00. The trial court found 
that " [forfeiture of this real property has served a 
remedial purpose of removing this drug house from 
the stream of narcotic commerce, thereby serving the 
public by removing a drug safehouse from its ongoing 
criminal use, and by cleansing the site of significant 
and ongoing drug distribution activities." The trial 
court concluded that the "forfeiture is the result of 
extensive, serious conduct by the claimant [Cannon] 
which presented significant threat of harm and cost to 
society." 
f 24 We do not condone any degree of drug 
trafficking; we recognize the great cost the State 
incurs in investigating, pursuing, and convicting 
offenders. We also understand the broad-scale effect 
of drug trafficking on society. As the trial court 
observed: "The use and sale of controlled substances 
is one of the single most serious factors affecting and 
utilizing the resources" of the courts and the criminal 
justice system, both on the state and federal level. 
However, these findings and conclusions are not 
sufficient to support this forfeiture in view of other 
factors. 
t 25 Measured by any standard, Cannon's drug 
operation was small, involving possession of less than 
two pounds of marijuana for sale in an eighteen month 
span. The trial court apparently agreed with this 
assessment at the time of trial when Cannon was 
placed on probation, although a jury had found her 
guilty of three felonies and a misdemeanor on charges 
stemming from the first search of her home. See 
supra note 1. The court allowed her to remain on 
probation after being convicted of an additional felony 
resulting from the second search. Cannon's actual 
fines and surcharges imposed on charges arising out 
of the first and second searches (FN 11) totaled only 
$4,625.00. Cannon was also subject to $5,035.10 as 
a tax or penalty for possessing nonstamped illegal 
drugs. In sum, the actual fines, surcharges, and 
penalties imposed amounted to $9,660.10. 
If 26 The State argues that Cannon faced "maximum 
possible penalties" of approximately $130,425.00 and 
"substantial" prison time. It repeatedly stresses these 
"maximum possible penalties," contending that these 
amounts should be used for measurement, as opposed 
to the actual penalties. The trial court also used these 
theoretical figures extensively in addressing the 
gravity of Cannon's offenses in its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The trial court on remand 
declared simply that the "value of the property 
forfeited does not grossly exceed the potential fines 
and fees in this case." 
f 27 The State argues that this fact alone shows that 
the forfeiture is not grossly disproportionate. 
However, the State does not provide any legal support 
for its comparison of theoretical maximum penalties 
with the *1261. value of the forfeited property. 
(FN 12) While reference to the maximum penalties is 
helpful in determining the gravity of the offenses, it 
has limited relevance in detennining proportionality. 
Here, the trial court placed too much reliance on the 
maximum penalties in its analysis of proportionality 
instead of focusing on the actual fines and penalties 
imposed. 
If 28 When we compare the (1) gravity of Cannon's 
conduct; (2) the actual fines, surcharges, and 
penalties of $9,660.10 imposed; and (3) her probation 
on the prison and jail sentences, with the value of the 
forfeited real property at approximately $80,000.00, 
we must conclude that there is a gross 
disproportionality here under the standards set forth in 
Bajakajian, and the forfeiture cannot be sustained. 
H. JUDICIAL NOTICE AS DUE PROCESS 
VIOLATION 
f 29 Cannon contends that the trial court violated 
her due process rights by taking judicial notice of the 
second and third searches of the defendant property as 
well as the resolution of criminal charges stemming 
from the second search. It is unnecessary to reach 
this question. In our above analysis of 
disproportionality, we have considered the 
controverted evidence regarding the second and third 
searches, but determined that the totality of all 
evidence does not raise Cannon's offenses to a level 
sufficient to overcome the disproportionality. 
If 30 We additionally do not need to reach Cannon's 
contention regarding double jeopardy. 
CONCLUSION 
f 31 Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude 
that assuming the house was an instrumentality of the 
defendant's drug offenses, the second prong of the 
"excessive fine" analysis is not met. The forfeiture of 
the defendant property is grossly disproportionate. 
Having decided the case on this basis, appellant's 
other arguments on appeal are rendered moot. 
If 32 Judgment reversed. 
f 33 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice 
ZIMMERMAN, and Justice RUSSON concur in 
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Chief Justice HOWE's opinion. 
K 34 Justice STEWART concurs in the result. 
(FNL) Cannon was convicted of: (1) possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree 
felony, for which she was sentenced to prison for 
zero to five years; (2) possession of cocaine, a 
second degree felony, for which she was sentenced 
to one to fifteen years; (3) illegal drug tax, a third 
degree felony, for which she was sentenced to zero 
to five years; and (4) possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, for which she 
was sentenced to not more than six months in jail. 
All terms were ordered to run concurrently. 
Additionally, Cannon was fined $2,000.00, and an 
additional $1,700.00 surcharge was imposed. 
(FN2.) See U.S. Const, amend. V.; Utah Const, 
art. I, §7 . 
(FN3.) See U.S. Const, amend. VIE; Utah Const, 
art. I, §9 . 
(FN4.) See U.S. Const, amend. V.; Utah Const, 
art. I, § 12. 
(FN5.) For a more extensive recitation of the 
analytical background to excessive fines protection 
and forfeiture, see generally, 392 South 600 East, 
886 P.2d 534; Kristen Michelle Caione, Note, 
When Does In Rem Civil Forfeiture Under 21 
U.S.C. 881(a)(7) Constitute an Excessive Fine?: An 
Overview and an Attempt to Set Forth a Uniform 
Standard, 47 Syracuse L.Rev. 1093 (1997). 
(FN6.) We note that an instrumentality inquiry is not 
relevant in cases dealing with the forfeiture of 
monies. Instead, such cases are examined using 
solely a proportionality determination. See 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329 & n. 9, 118 S.Ct. 2028; 
United States v. $273,969.04 United States 
Currency, 164 F.3d 462, 466 n. 3 (9th Cir.1999). 
(FN7.) Harmelin overrules Solem insofar as 
proportionality relates to an analysis under the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. However, Bajakajian, decided seven 
years after Harmelin, specifically references Solem 
in discussing the standard of gross 
disproportionality. 
(FN8.) The trial court, having adopted the State's 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
its own, addressed some of these factors and some 
of the Solem factors, albeit cursorily. Concerning 
the excessiveness issue, the trial court concluded: 
6. Forfeiture of the property described in this 
complaint is not excessive. 
a. There is a close nexus of the property to the 
extensive and continued criminal conduct of the 
claimant in this case. 
b. The value of the property forfeited does not 
grossly exceed the potential fines and fees in this 
case. 
c. The forfeiture will not significantly impact other 
residents of the property since all but one have also 
been implicated in the criminal conduct giving rise 
to forfeiture. 
d. The forfeiture is the result of extensive, serious 
conduct by the claimant which presented significant 
threat of harm and cost to society. 
e. Forfeiture of this property does not impose 
hardship upon the claimant that is more extensive or 
severe than would have been imposed for other, 
equally serious conduct, under the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
f . Forfeiture of property established to have been an 
instrumentality for the sale of drugs is authorized by 
virtually every state and federal government. 
*1261_ (FN9.) We note that none of these factors, 
taken individually, is dispositive. These factors 
should be considered and weighed together. 
(FN10.) The first two factors used in 6380 Little 
Canyon Road to determine culpability are more 
concerned with establishing instrumentality. We 
therefore will not include these two factors in our 
proportionality test. 
(FN11.) Charges arising out of the third search were 
dismissed. 
(FN 12.) In fact, at oral argument, upon being asked 
whether there was case law from which they derived 
this test, counsel for the State admitted that "I'm not 
sure that we relied on a case when we came up with 
our idea. I think that was just something we thought 
of." 
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conduct by the claimant which presented significant 
threat of harm and cost to society. 
e. Forfeiture of this property does not impose 
hardship upon the claimant that is more extensive or 
severe than would have been imposed for other, 
equally serious conduct, under the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
f. Forfeiture of property established to have been an 
instrumentality for the sale of drugs is authorized by 
virtually every state and federal government. 
*1261_ FN9. We note that none of these factors, 
taken individually, is dispositive. These factors 
should be considered and weighed together. 
FN 10. The first two factors used in 6380 Little 
Canyon Road to determine culpability are more 
concerned with establishing instrumentality. We 
therefore will not include these two factors in our 
proportionality test. 
FN11. Charges arising out of the third search were 
dismissed. 
FN 12. In fact, at oral argument, upon being asked 
whether there was case law from which they derived 
this test, counsel for the State admitted that "I'm not 
sure that we relied on a case when we came up with 
our idea. I think that was just something we thought 
of." 
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